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Abstract
In this paper we study the changes in corporate valuations induced by the adoption of the
euro as the common currency in Europe. We use corporate-level data from 17 European
countries of which 11 adopted the euro. We show that the introduction of the euro has
increased Tobins Q-ratios by 17:1% in the euro-area countries that previously had weak
currencies. Part of the increase in corporate valuations is explained by the decrease in
interest rates and by the decrease in the cost of equity. The increases in Tobins Q are larger
for rms that would be harmed by currency devaluations.
Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the euro, valuation, cost of capital,
currency risk, currency union.
JEL classication: F33, F36, G32
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the resulting introduction of a common cur-
rency for Europe on January 1, 1999, is arguably the most important institutional change
in international nancial markets during the past quarter century. Despite the historic sig-
nicance of the new currency, the euro has aroused a considerable amount of controversy
throughout its short history. The euro-skeptics have blamed the common currency for the
disappointing macroeconomic performance in the euro countries.1 Even within the euro
countries the euro has been criticized.2 The euro has existed for a short time, and a thor-
ough empirical analysis of its economic e¤ects is very hard at this point. However, assessing
the economic impact of the euro is very important, since some new members of the Euro-
pean Union are considering joining the EMU, while others -the UK in particular- have long
delayed or refused to join arguing that the costs outweigh the benets. This paper aims to
address the economic impact of the euro by looking at changes in the valuations of European
corporations around the introduction of the common currency. Corporate valuations are a
very appropriate way of assessing the impact of the euro keeping in mind the short history
of the new currency, since stock prices are forward looking and hence react fast to structural
changes that may have long-term consequences.
We use corporate-level data from eleven countries that adopted the euro,3 the three EU
countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the UK) that did not, as well as Norway and Switzerland.
Using data as of December 31 each year, we study how the introduction of the euro has
a¤ected rmsTobins Q in panel regressions that span from 1994 to 2004. We use 1998 as
the benchmark year for adoption of the euro for two reasons: First, on May 2, 1998, the
European Council decided which countries were allowed to enter the nal phase of EMU.
Second, the forward rates in all euro countries converged around the middle of 1998, implying
that using the 1997 observation would be premature and using the 1999 actual introduction
of the common currency would be too late.
There are two main channels through which the euro may increase the value of corpora-
tions. As the value of a rm equals the sum of expected future cashows discounted at the
cost of capital, the euro may have an e¤ect on rm value by increasing expected cashows,
or by decreasing the cost of capital. The euro may increase rmsexpected cashows by
reducing transaction costs and increasing trade in goods and services within the currency
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union - the benets of a shared currency already identied by Mundell (1961) in his seminal
paper. The euro could reduce cost of capital through two channels: First, the euro could
reduce the risk-free interest rate, especially for those countries that had high real risk-free
rates because of credibility problems in monetary policy. Second, the euro could reduce the
market risk premium. Perhaps the most obvious way the euro could reduce market risk pre-
mium is through eliminating intra-European currency risks, especially risks stemming from
unilateral currency devaluations. The euro may have also decreased market risk premium
by facilitating risk sharing among investors in EMU-countries.
We provide evidence of rm value increases that are consistent with the two channels.
First, we show that in the period 1998-2004, Tobins Q for rms in the euro countries
have increased by 9:0 percent compared to rms in non-euro countries, after controlling for
rm, country, and time specic e¤ects. When we control for changes in monetary policy
and macroeconomic expectations by including the short-term rate and the term-spread as
explanatory variables, the increase in Tobins Q is 7:8 percent. This implies that only part of
the overall increase in corporate valuations spurred by the euro is due to changes in interest
rates.
We nd that the e¤ect of the euro on corporate valuations is more signicant for the group
of countries - Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain - that devalued their currencies
during the ERM4-crisis of 1992-93. We label these countries as the "weak-euro countries." For
this group, the increase in Tobins Q is 12:8 percent after controlling for changes in interest
rates. Since the weak-euro countries are the ones for which the elimination of currency risks
was more valuable ex-ante, this evidence supports the hypothesis that the euro has led to
a reduction in currency risk and hence in the market risk premium. This is conrmed by
the nding that, even within rms in weak-euro countries, the increase in Tobins Q is much
larger among those rms whose stock returns were negatively correlated with depreciations
of the domestic currency. For those rms the increase in Q after 1998 is an additional 6:4
percent.
Some of our results are also consistent with an increase in expected cashows. We show
that Tobins Q for rms in strong-euro countries increases 6:1 percent after 1998, irrespective
of the rms currency exposure and after controlling for changes in interest rates. This nding
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is consistent with the reduction of market risk premium resulting from better risk sharing
opportunities. However, we also compute a proxy for the cost of equity capital, and show
that although it is negatively related to Tobins Q, reductions in the cost of equity can only
explain 0:5 percent of the increase in the Tobins Q in strong-euro rms, and 1:3 percent
of the increase in Tobins Q in weak-euro rms. Thus we conclude that the euro has also
a¤ected expected cashows positively.
There are some alternative explanations for our ndings. In principle, we document
increases in Tobins Q after 1998. But this period is also a period of macroeconomic conver-
gence of euro countries following the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, it can be possible that
rm valuations have increased as a result of this process of budget decits, government debt
reductions and price stability. However, we document that, even after controlling for changes
in these variables, the increase in Tobins Q is a signicant 15:3 percent for the weak-euro
countries.
In sum - the euro has increased the value of the rms that we expect ex ante to benet
the most from it: rms in countries with weak currencies, and rms that were harmed by
currency depreciations. This suggests that the benets of the euro come, to a large extent,
from the elimination of currency risks, especially the risk of unilateral devaluations. In
Section 1, we discuss the relationship between currency risks, devaluations, and rm value,
and argue that the common currency can increase valuations through a reduction in the
rms cost of equity.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the theoretical relationship between
the euro and corporate valuations. In Section 2, we describe the data, and in Section 3, we
study the valuation e¤ects of the common currency. In Section 4, we further analyze the
causes for valuation changes, and in Section 5, we study the impact of cost of equity changes.
Section 6 is devoted to additional robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
1 The Euro and Firm Valuations
The euro can a¤ect corporate valuations through two channels: It can have an impact
either on the rmscost of capital, or on expected cash ows. First, the euro can a¤ect a
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rms cost of capital in several ways:
 A main component of the cost of capital is the risk-free interest rate. The real risk-free
rates may have changed in Europe because since 1999, there is a common monetary
policy for the euro countries. The euro should have lowered real interest rates for
those countries that previously faced credibility problems in maintaining price stability.
Alesina and Barro (2002) argue that currency unions like the euro can be a good
commitment mechanism to monetary stability, and that they are especially benecial
for countries that have su¤ered from high ination rates.
 Another component in the cost of capital is the risk premium, including a risk premium
for currency risks. The adoption of the euro as a common currency of course means
that the nominal intra-European currency risks between the euro countries have been
eliminated. By using currency hedging, companies can eliminate some or all of their
foreign currency exposure. However, if rms do not fully hedge,5 currency risk is priced
in nancial markets, as implied by the international capital asset pricing model (see,
for instance, Adler and Dumas, 1983; Dumas and Solnik, 1995; De Santis and Gerard,
1998). Also, there are instances when rms are not able to hedge even if they would
like to -for example when impending currency devaluation dries the liquidity out of the
markets. In those cases, the elimination of currency risks should lead to a lower cost
of capital6.
 Financial market integration could have reduced the overall cost of capital through
better risk sharing opportunities (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Stulz, 1999). In particu-
lar, the euro may have increased nancial integration in Europe and reduced the home
equity bias by eliminating investment restrictions that some institutional investors had
prior to the adoption of the euro7. European pension funds typically have currency
matching rules, for example that they cannot allocate more than 20 percent of their
funds to assets denominated in a foreign currency. Before the common currency was
adopted, all securities denominated in another European currency were subject to this
restriction. Of course this restriction is now void for investments within the euro-area.
There is some evidence that investors in the euro countries have started to diversify
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their holdings more internationally. Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos, and Priestley (2006)
report that foreign equity holdings as a proportion of total equity holdings have in-
creased from 29 percent in 1992 to 50 percent in 1999 for pension funds in the euro
countries, whereas for pension funds from other countries, the share of foreign equity
has remained almost the same.
 The euro may also have decreased the cost of capital through increased competition
in European nancial markets. Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that the euro has
had a signicant positive impact on the amount of corporate bond issuance, which
almost tripled after the introduction of the common currency. Thus bond markets
have become a viable alternative to borrowing from banks.
In sum, corporations can be more valuable after the introduction of the euro because
the cost of capital has decreased due to lower real interest rates, due to the elimination of
intra-European currency risks, due to better risk sharing in European nancial markets, or
due to increased competition among providers of nance.
The second channel through which the euro could have a¤ected corporate valuations, is
the increase in rmsexpected cash ows. Higher cash ows can be the result of an increase
in trade in the euro area. Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002) argue that common
currencies have an enormous impact on bilateral trade ows between countries that share
the same currency. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) estimate that the euro would increase
intra-European trade by 50 percent. More recent papers demonstrate positive trade e¤ects,
but they are not as large as the earlier estimates. For example, Bun and Klaassen (2007)
nd that the euro has increased trade by 3 percent and Baldwin (2006) estimates that the
increase in trade is 9 percent within the euro-countries.
2 Data Description
2.1 Sources
The sample of rms used in this study is gathered fromWorldscope and covers the period
1994-2004. The sample includes rms from all the countries that adopted the euro, with the
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exception of Greece. Greece is excluded because it is hard to classify it as either a euro or a
non-euro country in the time period from the introduction of the euro in January 1999 until
it actually adopted the common currency in January 2001.8 Thus our sample includes rms
from the following eleven countries that have adopted the euro: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The
sample also include rms from the three remaining EU, noneuro countries (Denmark,9
Sweden, and the UK) as well as rms from Norway and Switzerland. We consider these
ve non-euro countries to constitute appropriate benchmark countries for an analysis of the
impact of the euro on rm value.
For our 16 sample countries, we require that rms have data available in Worldscope for
at least one year before and one year after the introduction of the euro, as dened below.
Because we do not require that the rms exist for the whole sample period of 1994-2004,
we end up with an unbalanced panel of rms.10 We exclude rm-years observations with
(i) zero sales, (ii) negative earnings (EBITDA) in excess of the book value of assets, or
(iii) negative book values of equity. These exclusions are done to ensure that speculative or
severely distressed rms do not have an undue inuence on our results. We also winsorize
the variables in the sample at the 1st and 99th percentiles to take into account potential
implausible gures and transcription errors in Worldscope. Our nal sample consists of
4; 242 rms (36; 246 rm-year observations): 2; 017 rms (17; 500 rm-year observations)
from the euro countries and 2; 225 rms (18; 746 rm-year observations) from the non-euro
countries. France contributes the most rms to the euro sample with 598 rms (4; 936 rm-
year observations), whereas the UK dominates the non-euro sample with 1; 513 rms (12; 672
rm-year observations). Our results are robust even when we exclude both France and the
UK from the sample. See Table 1 for a classication of the sample rms by country of
nationality.
[Insert Table 1]
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2.2 Country Classications
First we classify rms into two groups, depending on whether they are euro countries
or not. Next we further group rms within the euro group, depending on the stability of
their home country currencies relative to the German mark11 prior to the introduction of
the common currency. We classify weak-euro countries as those that signicantly devalued
their currencies with respect to the German mark during the currency crisis of 1992-93.
These countries are Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.12 Six other euro countries
- Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg13- did not experience
signicant currency depreciations during the currency crisis in early 1990s, hence the label
strong-euro countries.14 The classication into weak- and strong-euro countries is important,
because the previous monetary arrangement in Europe did not manage to provide a credible
commitment against devaluations for the weak-euro countries and hence the introduction of
a common currency could be especially signicant for these countries. Notice that the labels
of weak- and strong-euro countries only apply to the weakness and strength of the currencies
prior to the EMU, and not to the overall economic performance of the respective countries.
Alesina and Barro (2002) argue that a currency union like the EMU provide a more
credible commitment mechanism than unilateral pegs or currency boards. It is easy to change
the external value of a currency, when the currency is unilaterally pegged to another.15 It
is arguably very hard for any single country to leave the EMU, because it has not designed
an explicit break-up process. Hence, some authors have argued that the EMU is irreversible
(Scott, 1998).
2.3 Firm Characteristics
Appendix C shows the detailed denition of all the variables in our study. Our measure
of rm value is Tobins Q16, which is calculated in the paper as the book value of total assets
minus the book value of the common equity, plus the market value of the common equity,
divided by the book value of total assets.17 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for Tobins
Q as well as for other rm characteristics that we use in our analysis. The market value of
equity is recorded as of December 31 each year. For all other rm characteristics, the data
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is from the end of each rms scal year.18 Table 1 shows that average and median Qs are
signicantly larger in the non-euro countries when calculated over the entire sample period.
The table also shows that EMU rms, relative to non-euro rms, are: (i) larger, (ii) more
leveraged, and (iii) have less xed assets. These average di¤erences in rm characteristics
between the EMU and non-euro countries are taken into account in our analysis through the
use of xed rm e¤ects (see below).
One issue that we consider in the analysis is that increases in Tobins Q must be driven by
increases in market values, but also by reduction in the book value of assets. If the rms that
adopt the euro changed their investment policies (see Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson, 2006), we
will observe a change in Tobins Q which is unrelated to the market valuation. To address
this initial concern, we control in our cross-sectional regressions for measures of investment
(the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, as well as the ratio of net xed assets to
total assets). Additionally, we provide further evidence on valuation e¤ects by analyzing
stock prices around the introduction of the euro in Section 6.6.2. Finally, we also report
results based on a measure of Q adjusted by the worldwide yearly median in the industry,
to control for the possibility that measurement errors are not only country-specic but also
industry-specic.
A nal issue of concern that can cause di¤erences in Tobins Q is the di¤erence in con-
solidation rules among countries. As many continental European companies own stakes
in other rms, this can lead to problems in the computation of the Q ratio. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) perform a thorough estimation of Q with and
without taking into account consolidations, and nd that the correlation between the two
measures is 0:82. Moreover they conrm that their results remain unchanged after adjusting
Tobins Q. We take this problem into account by estimating our cross-sectional regressions
with rm-xed e¤ects. Therefore, unless there is any systematic change in these stakes after
the introduction of the euro, accounting consolidation does not pose any problem to our
analysis. We get data from the Securities Data Corporation on stake purchases by rms
in the 16 countries in our sample which are larger than 50 percent. There is an increasing
number of purchases in euro-countries (the number triples in the post-1998 period relative
to the pre-1998 period) in comparison to the non-euro countries (the number of purchases
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doubles). While the increase in market values is sizeable, the increase in book values is lower
than in non-euro countries, which suggests that acquisitions by euro rms have become more
frequent, but smaller. We have run panel regressions to test for any pattern, but the e¤ect
of the introduction of the euro is not signicant.
3 The Euro and Firm Value
3.1 Choice of Post-Euro Time Period
The aim of this study is to analyze whether the introduction of the euro has led to a
structural change in corporate valuations for the participating countries. Thus, we need
to identify the point in time when the structural change occurs. The euro was o¢ cially
introduced on January 1, 1999. However, it was on May 2, 1998, that the European Council
decided which countries were allowed to enter the nal phase of the EMU. Thus, since our
data is as of December 31 each year, choosing (the end of) 1998 as the rst year of the euro
seems reasonable. One objection to this choice is that forward looking markets are likely
to have already taken into account the e¤ects of the introduction of the euro at the end of
1997, or even earlier.19
Hardouvelis et al. (2006) use the forward interest rate di¤erential with Germany as a
measure of convergence to the EMU and show that nancial integration among European
markets was positively related to that measure. We also calculate forward rate di¤erentials
as in Hardouvelis et al. (2006) to get an indication of the likelihood of countries joining the
EMU. The calculations are outlined in Appendix A. Favero, Giavazzi, Iacone, and Tabellini
(1997) criticize deriving the probabilities for joining the EMU from simple forward rate
spread calculations. They show that probabilities based on average forward rates overes-
timate the true probabilities. Hence we do not try to interpret the spreads in terms of
probabilities. However, to the extent that actual forward rate spreads are di¤erent from
zero, their magnitude reects that the markets assign some positive probability to a country
not joining the EMU.
[Insert Figure 1]
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Figure 1 shows the average forward rate spread for the non-euro countries, as well as for
the strong-euro and weak-euro countries. While spreads outside the EMU do not converge
to zero, it is clear from the gure that, following a sharp decline in the years 1996 and 1997,
forward rate spreads converge to zero in mid-1998 in the euro countries. This is especially
true for the weak-euro countries.
In order to avoid drawing inferences from the forward rate spread levels, we estimate
the incremental changes on forward rate spreads by regressing the absolute value of the
monthly forward spreads20 on country and time dummy variables that are constructed in
the following way: For each year T , we construct a dummy variable that takes value one
whenever t  T , and zero otherwise, where t is the date when we observe the corresponding
forward spread. The coe¢ cients for such time dummies measure the incremental e¤ect on
spreads for each corresponding year. The results in Table 2 show that there are signicant
reductions in spreads for all countries in years 1996 and 1997. However, the regression results
show a nal, permanent convergence in spreads in 1998, both in the weak- and strong-euro
countries. Indeed, the reduction in the absolute spread is 2.3 percent in the weak-euro
countries, and 0.4 percent in the strong-euro countries. The average spreads as of December
1998 in the non-euro, weak-euro, and strong-euro countries are, respectively, 5:37 percent,
0:27 percent, and 0:00 percent, and they do not change afterwards for the EMU-countries.21
We can thus conclude that it is not until 1998 that the uncertainty regarding which countries
would adopt the euro disappears. Based on these results, we consider the end of 1998 to be
a reasonable and conservative choice for the start of the post-euro time period. But because
the above results show that markets in 1997 had already anticipated that the strong-euro
countries would adopt the euro, we will also test the robustness of our results to alternative
denitions of the post-euro time period.
[Insert Table 2]
3.2 Univariate Analysis
Table 3 reports the average Tobins Q of the sample rms before and after 1998. Besides
reporting averages based on absolute Tobins Q values, we also report averages based on
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industry-adjusted Qs. The industry-adjusted Tobins Q is computed as the rms Q minus
the median Q of the rms in the corresponding 2-digit SIC group, computed across all
countries covered by Worldscope. As can be seen in Table 3, Tobins Q is larger in the non-
euro countries than in the euro countries before 1998 (1:74 vs. 1:51, signicant di¤erence
at the 1 percent level), and it is larger in strong-euro countries than in weak-euro countries
(1:59 vs. 1:29, signicant di¤erence at the 1 percent level). Although the magnitude of the
di¤erence shrinks, this ranking remains after the introduction of the common currency, and
it does not depend on whether we measure Q in absolute values, or adjusted by industry.
It is interesting that, except for the weak-euro countries, Tobins Q falls signicantly after
1998, and especially in non-euro countries (a drop in Q of 0:28). However, the industry-
adjusted Q increases in the euro area in 1998-2004 with respect to the previous years: The
increase is 0:07, signicant at the one percent level. But if falls in non-euro rms (0:29 vs.
0:41 before 1998).
[Insert Table 3]
3.3 Regression Analysis: Method and Main Results
3.3.1 Method
To analyze the e¤ects of the introduction of the euro we estimate a xed-e¤ects panel
regression model for the 1994-2004 time period with the logarithm of Tobins Q as the
dependent variable. As a robustness measure, we also use the industry-adjusted Tobins Q
as our dependent variable. The impact of the euro is measured using a dummy variable,
EMU country x post-euro time period,which takes the value one for rms in the euro
countries for years 1998-2004, and zero otherwise. Alternatively, we use two dummy variables
indicating rms in the strong- and weak-euro countries, respectively, in the post-euro time
period. More formally, we estimate the following model by OLS:
logQict = Yt + Fi + Xict + Zct + EUROct + "ict, (1)
where Qict is Tobins Q for rm i in country c at time t, Yt is the xed time e¤ect for
year t, Fi is the xed rm e¤ect for rm i, Xict represent rm characteristics, Zct represents
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country characteristics, and EUROct is the dummy variable(s) indicating whether the euro
was adopted or not by country c at time t. The estimated e¤ect of the euro is captured byb.
The xed year e¤ects capture common time trends across both euro- and non-euro-rms.
By using rm-specic xed e¤ects, we simultaneously control for both constant country
factors (e.g., taxation, accounting rules, legal environment) and for constant rm factors
(e.g., industry e¤ects22). The rm characteristics used as controls (Xict) are: size, measured
as the log of the rms sales (in euros); protability, measured as the ratio of earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets; leverage, measured
as the book value of non-equity liabilities divided by total assets; the ratio of xed tangible
assets to total assets; the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; and the ratio of R&D
expenses to total assets. Firm size is included because smaller rms tend to have greater
growth opportunities. The tangibility of assets is typically negatively related to the rms
investment opportunities, whereas capital expenditures and R&D expenses are positively
related. Leverage has been found to have a negative e¤ect on Tobins Q (McConnell and
Servaes, 1990). Protability directly a¤ects a rms value.
As country controls (Zct), we use real GDP growth rate and the log of GDP per capita to
account for cross-country di¤erences in the business cycle and wealth. Furthermore, the euro
rst depreciated and then appreciated dramatically with respect to the US dollar during our
time period. Therefore, we also include the yearly change in the domestic currency/USD
exchange rate as a control to make sure that our results are not caused by a signicant
depreciation or appreciation of the euro or its legacy currencies with respect to the dollar.
We gather data on the exchange rate of domestic currency/USD during the sample period
from Datastream. After 1998, the exchange rate for each EMU country is implicitly obtained
from the euro/dollar exchange rate. We then calculate the change in the exchange rate for
each country and year in the sample.
We further want to nd out if the possible changes in Q are due to changes in the level of
interest rates induced by the new monetary policy environment. In unreported regressions
we nd that, relative to non-euro countries, short-term interest rates in weak-euro countries
fell by 2:4 percent after 1998, while there was not signicant decline in short rates in the
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strong-euro countries. As we described earlier, lower interest rates imply a lower cost of
capital and therefore a higher rm value. Thus, our results could simply reect the impact
of the monetary union on participating countries risk-free interest rates. Therefore, we
control for the level of short-term interest rates by including the 6-month risk free rate in
our Q regressions for each country.23 In addition, monetary policy is also an important
determinant of the term structure spread (see, for instance, Estrella and Mishkin, 1997).
Hence we include the term-spread as an explanatory variable as well (10-year government
bond rate minus the 6-month t-bill rate).
Equation (1) is a typical example of a di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DD) estimation, where
we try to identify a causal relationship between a treatment (the introduction of the euro)
and an endogenous variable for a large number of rms from both a¤ected and una¤ected
countries. To deal with the fact that the standard errors in a DD estimation are biased due
to serial correlation, we estimate robust standard errors that are adjusted for clustering of
observations by country. This is one of the methods for dealing with serial correlation in
DD estimation suggested by Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004). Another method
suggested by Bertrand et al. for dealing with this problem is a time-series, simple aggregation
of the data. The method consists of ignoring all time-series e¤ects by averaging the data
before and after the regime change and then run the DD estimation on the resulting two-
period panel data set. We use also this method as a robustness test. To this end, we
rst calculate pre- and post-euro rm averages for all the variables in the dataset, thereby
obtaining two observations per rm. We then run the main Q regressions on this two-period
panel where the year xed e¤ects are replaced by one dummy variable indicating the post-
euro time period.
3.3.2 Main Estimation Results
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of DD-estimation using the full panel of data with
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level. Because the endogenous variable
in our regression is the log of Q, the interpretation of the coe¢ cients is straightforward and
represents the percentage change in Q induced by either being a strong euro country, being a
weak euro country, or in general adopting the euro in 1998. We also estimate the regressions
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using industry-adjusted Q as our endogenous variable, and all the results are qualitatively
very similar.
[Insert Table 4]
Focusing on model (1), our rst important result is that rm value in the euro countries
has increased by 9 percent compared to non-euro countries from 1998 onwards. The coe¢ -
cient is signicant at the 5 percent level. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is important if we
take into account that Tobins Q decreases 7 percent on average in 1998-2004 with respect to
1994-1997 for euro-countries (Table 3). This implies that, ceteris paribus, EMU-rms grew
in value not only compared to non-euro rms, but also relative to their own pre-euro values.
In model (2) of Table 4, we distinguish between strong- and weak-euro countries. Our
results show, in line with Dumas and Solnik (1995), and Bodart and Reding (1999), that
rms in countries with weaker currencies beneted more from the introduction of the euro.
Firms in Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain enjoy a 17:1 percent increase in Q
relative to non-euro countries starting from 1998. Firms in strong-euro countries experience
increases in valuation of 5:7 percent on average (the p-value for the di¤erence of these two
coe¢ cients is below 0:001). These results are consistent with Alesina and Barro (2002), since
our weak countries are precisely the countries that had more credibility problems in their
monetary policies manifested by periodic currency depreciations.
Models (3) and (4) use the industry-adjusted Tobins Q as the dependent variable. Results
remain very strong. Overall, the euro-dummy coe¢ cient is 0:137;24 which is signicant at
the 5 percent level. The weak-euro-dummy is 0:251, and the strong-euro-dummy is 0:091
(signicant at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively).
We nd our controls to have the expected signs in models (1) - (4). As a measure of
rm-level growth opportunities, size is negatively related to value. More protable rms are
more valuable (signicant coe¢ cients in all estimations at the 1 percent level). Firm value
decreases with leverage (signicant at the 1 percent level). The ratio of tangible assets to total
assets displays negative and signicant coe¢ cients. Firms with more growth opportunities
(higher CAPEX) are worth more, although we do not nd a signicant e¤ect on R&D
expenses. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, increases in concurrent domestic economic growth
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have a positive impact on rm value (as expected), but the coe¢ cient is only signicant in
some specications. Finally, there is no evidence that the coe¢ cient on the relative change in
the domestic currency with respect to the US dollar is di¤erent from zero across the di¤erent
model specications.
4 What Could Cause Increases in Valuations?
4.1 Changes in Interest Rates and Growth Expectations
In this section we start exploring the potential reasons why rms in the euro area experi-
ence such high valuation increases. The rst obvious candidate is the change in the risk-free
interest rates, as discussed in Section 3.3. To test for this we include the short-term nominal
interest rate for each country and year in models (5) to (8) in Table 4.
We also control for the term spread (the di¤erence between the ten-year bond yield and
the six-month rate), as a proxy for expected future GDP growth. Estrella and Hardouvelis
(1991) and Jorion andMishkin (1991), for instance, show that the term spread predicts future
real economic activity. An increase in the spread is a measure of greater economic prospects,
and indeed in unreported regressions we also nd that the term spread has increased overall
by 0:6 percent in euro countries, irrespective of whether they have weak or strong currencies.25
In model (5) of Table 4 we show that the reduction in short-term rates is signicantly
associated to increases in Tobins Q. A one-standard deviation reduction in interest rates
(3:88 percent) is associated with an increase in rm Tobins Q of 10:86 percent. Because
short rates fell by 2:4 percent in weak-euro countries, approximately one third of the 16 per-
cent increase in value after 1998 in weak-euro countries can be attributed to reductions in
short-term interest rates. Model (6) indeed conrms this result. (The coe¢ cient "Weak-euro
country x post-euro dummy" decreases to 0:115 from 0:167, although the short-rate becomes
marginally insignicant.) For the strong-euro countries, there is no change in the magni-
tude of the strong-euro dummy coe¢ cient, since the short-rate does not fall (the coe¢ cient,
however, becomes marginally insignicant).
The term spread is not signicant, which is evidence that future growth prospects do
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not lead to larger valuations, at least when we control for rm-specic factors that reect
future growth. Another reason could be that higher term-spread also predicts increases in
future short-term interest rates (see for example, Fama, 1990, and Mishkin, 1990). Thus the
interpretation for the increase in term-spread is ambiguous.
In summary, part of the e¤ect of the euro on rm value can be attributed to interest rate
reductions (about one third of the total e¤ect). Reduction in interest rates are reductions
in one of the main components of a rms cost of capital. In the subsequent analyses, we
always include the short-term nominal interest rate and the term premium as explanatory
variables in our regressions.
When we use the industry-adjusted Q as a dependent variable, we nd that valuations
are not signicantly higher in strong-euro countries after 1998. We argue that the entry
of those countries with the possible exception of Belgium to the common currency area
was well expected in 1998. Hence it is entirely possible that the positive e¤ects had to
a large extent already been incorporated into stock prices before 1998. Consistent with
this reasoning Hardouvelis et al. (2006) nd a signicant decrease in cost of equity for the
core-euro countries (except for Germany) prior to the introduction of the euro.
In Panel B of Table 4 we repeat the analysis in Panel A using the time-series aggregation
method. The pooled dataset consists of 8; 484 rm-period observations (two observations
per rm). Since the euro-dummy is signicant at the 1 percent level both with and without
the short-term interest rate and term-spread as explanatory variables, we conrm the results
in panel A. As in Panel A, rmsTobins Q increases in weak-euro countries by 17 percent,
and by 7:5 percent in strong-euro countries. Signicance levels fall, but the magnitude of
the coe¢ cients reects similar quantitative results to the ones described above.
Because our results using the aggregated sample do not di¤er signicantly from the results
in Panel A, we will in the remainder of the paper present results using the DD-methodology
adjusted with an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. Bertrand et al. (2004) prefer this
method as well.
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4.2 The Value of Macroeconomic Convergence
Our results could be due to the introduction of the common currency, but also to macro-
economic developments caused by the oncoming monetary union. In fact, most of the coun-
tries that adopted the euro in 1999 went through a severe period of macroeconomic conver-
gence. The Maastricht Treaty of February 1992 established the time frame and procedures
for implementing the monetary union, including the criteria required for EU members to
qualify for the third phase of the EMU. Our objective in this section is to determine the
extent to which the valuation e¤ects we have identied are driven by the euro itself, rather
than by the convergence process that lowered interest rates, reduced budged decits, gov-
ernment spending, and ination. Some of the changes the euro countries implemented were
actually dramatic: Belgium had a government budget decit representing 8 percent of GDP
in 1992. The decit was 2 percent in 1998. Long-term interest rates went down in Spain
from 14.7 percent in 1990 to 5.8 percent in 1997. As suggested by this example, most of the
macroeconomic changes spurred by the convergence process happened before 1998, hence
they should not be able to explain valuation changes after 1998. We now test their impact
on our results.
We rst construct measures of macroeconomic convergence. According to the Maastricht
Treaty member states should fulll the following criteria in order ti qualify for the third
phase of the EMU:26
1. Price stability: The average rate of ination should not exceed, by more than 1.5
percentage points, that of the three best performing member states in terms of price
stability.
2. Government nancial position: The decit should not exceed 3 percent of GDP. In
addition, the public debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP, unless it is su¢ ciently
diminishing and approaching 60 percent at a satisfactory pace.
3. Observance of the (normal) uctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate
Mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS), without severe tensions for at
least two years.
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4. Durability of convergence: The average of the long-term interest rate should not exceed
by more than 2 percentage points that of the three best performing member states in
terms of price stability.
We gather data on ination, government decit over GDP, long-term interest rates, and
public debt over GDP from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) database. We ignore
convergence criterion (3) because it is already considered in our classication of countries
into weak- and strong-euro countries. We calculate convergence requirements for each of
the macroeconomic variables, and calculate the position of each country during each of the
years 1994 to 2004 in two di¤erent ways. We calculate the Adjusted Convergence Variables
as follows: If a country satises the corresponding convergence criterion, we assign a value
of zero. Otherwise we compute the di¤erence between the macroeconomic variable and the
corresponding convergence requirement. The Unadjusted Convergence Variables are simply
the raw values of the macroeconomic variables.
Note that we calculate the convergence variables for all the countries in our sample, in-
cluding the non-euro countries. In fact Denmark fully satised the convergence requirements
in 1997, but they opted out of the system. In 1998, all the non-euro countries in our sample
already met the Maastricht criteria, except for the level of government debt in Sweden, which
did not reach the Maastricht levels until 2001.
We also take into account changes in taxation. Corporate tax rates declined in Europe
over the period 1995-2000 by an average of 9:5 percent.27 Interestingly, they fell more in euro
countries (an average of 11:38 percent) than in noneuro countries (5:8 percent on average),
with signicant tax reductions in Ireland (where corporate tax rates fell from 36 percent
in 1996 to 16 percent in 2000) and Italy (from 53:2 percent to 40:25). Thus, changes in
corporate taxation could also be a potential explanation of our results. To control for this,
we include the corporate tax rate for each country and year.28 Note that we do not include
the short-term rate and the term-spread as explanatory variables because we use long-term
nominal interest rates as an explanatory variable, as stipulated by the Maastricht treaty.
[Insert Table 5]
In Table 5, we use both the adjusted and unadjusted convergence variables as explanatory
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variables. We show that the valuation e¤ect we identify is caused by the introduction of the
common currency itself, and not by the macroeconomic convergence process. We nd that
the euro yields positive valuation e¤ects for rms from the weak-euro countries (15:2 percent
signicant at the 1 percent level), as well as the strong-euro countries (6:1 percent increase,
signicant at the 5 percent level). The coe¢ cients for the convergence criteria variables are
insignicant (except for the long-term rate in the rst specication). One possible reason is
that the results of the convergence process were well known before 1998 and already priced
by the markets. Alternatively the convergence process su¤ered from credibility problems:
markets may have believed that the convergence process could be reversed and that the
results were only temporary.
Corporate tax rates have a signicant e¤ect on Tobins Q, but with the opposite sign to
what should be expected. One possible explanation is that reduction in corporate tax rates
are typically accompanied by broadening of the tax base (see Desai, Dyck, and Zingales,
2007). Thus it is feasible that the amount of taxes paid has actually increased.
We also regress Tobins Q on the values of the raw macroeconomic variables themselves,
without adjusting for convergence. Once more, the e¤ect of the euro is economically and
statistically signicant.
An alternative explanation for the increase in Tobins Q is an increase in the frequency
of cross-border mergers. Firms in the euro countries may have become very lucrative targets
for other rms because by acquiring rms within the EMU, other rms coming from outside
would gain better market access. If acquirers in cross-border mergers pay high premia and
if rms in the euro countries are targets more often than other rms, rms in the euro
countries will on average display valuation increases relative to other rms. In unreported
regressions we examine this hypothesis. We nd that the e¤ect of cross-border acquisitions
is insignicant, and the e¤ect of the euro still remains the same.
5 Additional Results
In this section we provide evidence on which rms and countries are the most a¤ected by
the euro. We will show that Tobins Q has increased the most for rms that are: (i) more
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exposed to exchange rate variability; (ii) smaller. Together with the results in Section 3, we
are able to characterize the typical rm for which the e¤ect of the euro has been economically
signicant.
5.1 Exchange Rate Exposure and Firm Value
Although all rms can benet from the common currency, the euro should be of more
benet to those rms that were exposed to intra-European currency risks that existed before
the introduction of the common currency. To study the e¤ects of currency exposure, we
sort companies within a country into three groups by using individual companies stock
market returns. In the rst group we have companies whose stock returns signicantly
increase when the domestic currency depreciates with respect to the euro (positive-exposure
companies). In the second group we place those companies whose stock returns signicantly
decrease (negative-exposure companies). The third group is for companies that did not
have a signicant currency exposure. We detail the computation of the exchange rate beta
coe¢ cients (ERBs) in Appendix B.
Positive ERBs imply that the rms revenues are generated mostly in foreign markets,
the rms liabilities are mostly denominated in the domestic currency, and that the rms
currency exposure is not hedged by other means - derivatives or foreign nancing. Conversely,
a negative ERB is an indication that the rms revenues originate mostly in the domestic
market, the rms liabilities are mostly denominated in a foreign currency, and that exposure
to currency risk is not hedged. As a result, rms with positive ERBs have their assets
positively exposed to currency depreciations. Similarly, rms with negative ERBs have their
liabilities positively inuenced by currency depreciations.
Table B1 in Appendix B shows the number of rms in each country with either positive
or negative ERBs. We also report the median exchange rate beta among all rms in a given
country. Only four countries in the EMU area have positive exposure: Germany, France,
the Netherlands, and Portugal. Norway and Switzerland have positive exposure as well. On
average, 14:41 percent of the rms in euro countries display a signicant currency exposure
at the 10 percent level in double-sided t-tests (or, equivalently, at the 5 percent level in
one-sided t-tests), and 16:9 percent in the non-euro countries.
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In Table 6 we present the results of the xed e¤ects model with a further classication
of euro-rms into signicantly positive, signicantly negative, and insignicant ERB rms.
[Insert Table 6]
We rst report that, irrespective of the sign and magnitude of the currency exposure, rm
values in strong-euro countries have signicantly increased 6:5 percent (signicant at the 10
percent level after controlling for interest rate changes), while rms in weak-euro countries
have increased 10:8 percent (signicant at the 1 percent level). Firms with negative and
signicant ERB in weak-euro countries have enjoyed additional Tobins Q increases of 6:4
percent. The di¤erence between negative ERB rms in weak and strong euro countries is
signicant as well (p-value 0:010).
Therefore, a devaluation risk has commanded a high premium for those rms that were
negatively exposed to currency depreciations in countries with weak currencies. This is
consistent with the view that perhaps the major benet from the euro has been the added
exchange rate credibility against devaluations that the weak-euro countries have gained by
adopting the common currency. However, the result that positive-ERB rms have also
benetted from the euro suggests that the elimination of devaluation risk is not the only
factor at play.
5.2 Large vs. Small Firms
Some papers have argued that larger rms benet more from integration, since large
rms are more exposed to currency risks, and foreign investors prefer to invest in large rms
(Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Kang and Stulz, 1997). Bartram and Karolyi (2006) nd
that the decrease in systematic risk is bigger for multinational rms, indicating that cost of
capital should have decreased more for larger rms. However, Allayannis, Lel, and Miller
(2004) report that larger rms are much more likely to use derivatives to hedge their currency
exposure, so that elimination of currency risks should not matter as much for larger rms.
Therefore, it is an empirical question whether the benets of the euro are di¤erent across
rm size.
[Insert Table 7]
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In Table 7 we classify rms into large and small, depending on their total sales, relative to
the median sales of the rms in the sample in 1997.29 Among rms in strong-euro countries,
we nd that the e¤ect of the euro is concentrated in small rms (increases in Tobins Q of 5:9
percent, signicant at the 5 percent level after controlling for changes in the short-rate and
term spread). In weak-euro countries, although we nd a larger e¤ect for small rms (15:3
percent vs. 11:1 percent) the di¤erence is not signicant (p-value 0:312). Test of di¤erences
among coe¢ cients show that the e¤ect of the euro on small rms is signicantly larger in
weak-euro countries (p-value of the di¤erence 0:077). Therefore, these results show that the
e¤ects of the euro are widespread among rms in weak-euro countries, and signicant for
small rms in strong-euro countries.
5.3 Results by Country
We provide results by country in Table 8. Table 8 conrms that valuation results in
general are stronger for countries we have labelled as the weak-euro countries. Among
the strong-euro countries France and Belgium show the highest value increases (8:6 and
6:4 percent increases, respectively). These results t well with these countriesexperience
during the ERM-crisis in 1992-93. Although France and Belgium did not devalue their
currencies, they experienced several attacks against their currencies. Among the weak-euro
countries valuation increases for Ireland are the smallest (the coe¢ cient is not signicant).
Even though Ireland was forced to devalue its currency during the ERM-crisis, its currency
subsequently recovered quite fast and as a result experienced the smallest devaluation among
the weak-euro countries.30
[Insert Table 8]
6 Conrming Evidence
In this section we provide more conrming evidence regarding our previous results and
interpretations. First, we further test the hypothesis that lower cost of capital explains the
valuation results by producing cost of equity estimates and test whether they have dropped
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for euro rms after 1998. We also provide additional evidence on the valuation e¤ects by
examining stock returns as an alternative to the Tobins Q approach. Finally, we use the
opinion poll results in Sweden prior to the countrys EMU referendum as an explanatory
variable in examining stock returns.
6.1 The Euro and FirmsCost of Equity Capital
In the literature, there are two methods of computing the cost of equity capital. The
rst method is based on past stock returns, and calculates the cost of equity capital as the
average realized return over the current year. This methodology relies on an asset pricing
model to compute market-adjusted returns, and assumes that realized returns are a proxy
for expected returns. Fama and French (1997) nd that estimates of cost of equity capital
for industries are very imprecise, with standard errors of more than 3 percent. These errors
are due to uncertainty regarding the true factor risk premiums, and they can be larger when
estimating rmscost of equity capital. Moreover, Elton (1999) shows that realized return
are a very biased estimate of expected returns.
A second method consists of estimating the cost of equity based on current stock prices
and analyst earnings forecasts. Easton, Taylor, Shro¤, and Sougiannis (2002) summarize all
these models, which are based on estimates of residual income based on earnings forecasts,
and on backing out the cost of equity and expected growth rates using the current stock price.
We follow a similar approach, by making the conservative assumption that the expected
growth in earnings beyond a one-year horizon is zero, and then computing prices as:
Pt =
E[EPSt+1]
ret
(2)
where Pt is the current stock price, E [EPSt+1] is the earnings forecast, and ret is the cost
of equity capital. Therefore, our estimate of ret is the forward-looking earnings yield r
e
t =
E[EPSt+1]
Pt
.31 We obtain one year ahead earnings estimates from I/B/E/S. We are able to
estimate ret for 27; 691 rm-year observations. We then estimate a panel regression of the
cost of equity capital on the euro dummies and the standard controls.
[Insert Table 9]
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Model (1) in Table 9 shows that, without controlling for the short rate and the term
spread, the cost of equity capital has dropped in weak-euro countries by 2:5 percent after
1998. This e¤ect is not signicant once we control for short-term rates and the term spread
(model 2), which suggests that reductions in the cost of equity have been caused by reductions
in the risk-free rate alone. Moreover, we do not nd changes in the cost of equity in strong-
euro rms after 1998, yet we have identied signicant increases in Tobins Q for those
countries in our earlier results. These two regressions lead us to conclude that the valuation
e¤ects we identify cannot be ascribed to reductions in the cost of equity alone.
We replicate the Tobins Q regressions controlling for changes in the cost of equity Because
re is endogenous in these regressions, we interpret our results in terms of correlations. In
models (3) and (4) we show that cost of equity and Q are have a strong negative relationship
as expected (coe¢ cient of  0:921, signicant at the 1 percent level). However, even after
controlling for the cost of equity, the euro-country dummies are still signicant (5:7 percent
increase in strong-euro countries, and 11:5 percent increase in weak-euro countries), which
suggests that either the forward looking earnings yield is not a good proxy for the cost of
equity, or that reductions in the cost of capital are not the only source of valuation increases.
6.2 Evidence Based on Stock Returns
Our evidence above is based on changes in price levels (Tobins Q) rather than changes
in expected returns. Hong and Stein (2006) justify this choice in a study of local investment
bias by arguing that when all changes in risk premia are permanent, price e¤ects translate
into very small expected return di¤erentials. The expected return changes could be so small
that they become statistically insignicant, no matter how large the actual price e¤ect is.
Bearing the above argument in mind, we still try to provide additional evidence based on
stock returns. To that end, we replicate the methodology in Henrys (2000) study of stock
market liberalizations. We rst construct within-country portfolios of monthly stock returns,
classied by the ERB of the rms. That is, within each country, we construct three value-
weighted portfolios: One portfolio contains all rms whose ERB is positive and signicant. A
second portfolio contains all rms whose ERB is negative and signicant. The third portfolio
contains all other rms, for which the currency exposure is not signicant. Stock returns and
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market capitalization is from Datastream. We therefore have 132 monthly observations on
16 3 portfolios (a total of 6; 336 observations). Henry (2000) denes the event window as
the liberalization month plus the preceding six months. We consider May 1998 as the month
of actual introduction of the euro, since it was then that it was decided which countries
would join, and also consider a window of six moths (November 1997 to May 1998). We
then regress monthly returns on event dummies, interacted with portfolio characteristics
(ERBs) and country characteristics (euro membership and strong/weak classication). We
also estimate country-xed e¤ects. Results are in Table 10. We also control for the MSCI
World Index, and the MSCI Europe Index, as proxies for the market return under the
assumption that European markets are integrated.
[Insert Table 10]
The results in Table 10 conrm a strong market reaction to the introduction of the euro,
with stock return increases that vary between 3:4 and 4:7 percent in euro countries. The
cross-sectional evidence is similar to the results for Tobins Q. Weak-EMU rms experience
stock return increases of 5:3 5:6 percent, and among these stock returns are larger for rms
with negative and signicant ERB (increase of 7:8 percent). All results are signicant at
the 1 percent level, and there is a signicant di¤erence between positive and negative ERB
rms in weak-euro countries (p-value 0:0012). In model (4), the joint value of the coe¢ cients
suggests an insignicant return in strong-euro rms, and in rms with positive exposure.
Overall, the evidence based on stock returns shows that the euro has increased share-
holder returns for the rms which were supposed to enjoy ex-ante larger reductions in the
cost of capital: Firms in weak-euro countries and rms with negative exposure to currency
depreciations. The stock return evidence is consistent with our evidence using Tobins Q as
a dependent variable.
6.3 Evidence Based on Poll Results in Sweden
We can provide additional evidence based on the market reaction to news about the
incorporation of a given country to the common currency. On September 14, 2003, Sweden
held a referendum on whether the country should join the euro.32 The referendum took place
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despite the assassination of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh an ardent supporter of Sweden
joining the EMU on September 10, 2003. The referendum produced a strong "no" vote
to the euro, with a 56:1 percent opposition, and a turnout of 82 percent of those entitled to
vote.
The Swedish referendum is a good laboratory to test the expected e¤ects of the euro on
Swedish companies following the results of the polls that were conducted before the actual
vote took place.33 We obtain data on the results from every published opinion poll in Sweden
between January 2000 and September 11, 2003, from Sinovate Temo, a Swedish polling rm.
There are 211 observations. For each poll, we know the percent of yes/no/undecided votes,
and the day when the results were published. In 25 percent of the polls, the percent of "yes"
votes exceeds the percent of "no" votes. In 72 percent of the polls, the opposite is true. Note
that, even in these cases, there must be a larger percent of undecided voters in some polls
(this happens in 23 out of 211 polls). In the last month preceding the September 14 vote,
all polls predict the "no" to win, except for one single poll with a 50/50 split.
[Insert Table 11]
We regress weekly stock returns for individual rms in Sweden on the domestic market
return, the change in exchange rate between the euro and the US dollar, and two indicators
of poll results. We control for the euro/dollar rate because it was argued ex-post that the
reason for the result of the referendum was the weakness of the euro against the dollar in
the months prior to the vote. The rst indicator equals one if the percent of "yes" votes in
an opinion poll increases relative to the previous one, zero otherwise. The second dummy
variable equals one if the percent of "yes" votes in the poll exceeds the percent of "no" votes
in the poll. We ignore undecided voters, and use only the weeks when an opinion poll was
published. We interact these dummy variables with the sign of the ERB of each rm. Results
are in Table 11. In model (1) we show a positive market reaction whenever the percentage of
"yes" votes increase with respect to the preceding poll. Such a reaction is however negative
( 5:6 percent combined) for positive-ERB rms, i.e. for rms that would benet from weak
krona. We also nd that rm returns deteriorate as the euro depreciates with respect to the
dollar.
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In model (2) we show the e¤ect of a "yes" vote being ahead in the polls. It results on a
positive return for negative-ERB rms, and a negative return for positive-ERB rms. Firms
that would be harmed by a depreciation of the krona display a positive return of 0:8 percent
per week (signicant at the 10 percent level), while rms that benet from depreciations
show a negative return of 1:7 per week.(signicant at the 5 percent level). These results
conrm our prior ndings.
7 Conclusion
Economic and Monetary Union and the adoption of a common currency is a major social
experiment that also has signicant economic and nancial implications. This article is a
rst attempt to study the e¤ects of the euro on rm value using corporate-level data. We
show that valuations for rms from the euro countries that devalued their currencies during
the ERM-crisis in 1992-93 have grown by 17:1 percent in the period 1998-2004 compared
to the ve non-euro countries. The strong results for the weak-euro countries throughout
the whole paper are consistent with the theoretical results of Alesina and Barro (2002), who
show that currency unions should be most benecial for countries that have su¤ered from
credibility problems in their exchange rate and monetary policies. After we control for the
level of short-term interest rates and the term spread, the increase in valuations decreases to
14:9 percent for rms from the weak-euro countries. Lower real interest rates and improved
monetary policy credibility are thus important ingredients in explaining the positive impacts
that the euro has caused on corporate valuations, but by no means the most important reason
for the increase in corporate valuations.
It seems that ruling out the periodic currency devaluations that the weak-euro countries
experienced when they had independent currencies is a major factor in explaining the positive
valuation e¤ects. This conclusion is at odds with the view that currency risks are not
that important. Maybe part of the reason that most studies nd exposures to currency
uctuations to be of secondary importance is that currency risks are indeed economically
insignicant most of the time, but become very important when there are dramatic changes
in exchange rates typically large currency devaluations. This view is very consistent with
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our strong results for rms from the weak-euro countries.
Furthermore, we show that the cost of equity has also declined for rms from the weak-
euro countries. However, this decline in cost of equity can explain only a part of the increase
in corporate valuations. Thus we conclude that valuations have also increased because cash
ows are expected to increase in the future.
Our paper documents a positive market reaction to the common currency. An interesting
question is whether such a valuation e¤ect has translated into more real e¤ects. For instance,
the Tobins Q theory of investment predicts that increases in Q should be accompanied
by increases in rm investment. Indeed Bris et al. (2006) provide results documenting
a signicant increase in investments for rms from the weak-euro countries in the period
1998-2004.
Do our results imply that all European countries should join the EMU? It might be
tempting to say yes, but as in economics in general, the right answer should be: It depends.
We have shown in this paper that the prior strength or weakness of a countrys currency is
decisive. If a candidate countrys currency has experienced regular devaluations, then the
answer should be yes. If the candidate countrys currency has been stable, there seems to
be very small benets in joining the euro, at least on a corporate level.
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A Appendix: Calculation of Forward Rate Di¤erentials
Following Hardouvelis et al. (2006), we calculate monthly forward rate di¤erentials from
swap rates between xed and oating rate government bonds. We calculate 8-year forward
rates in 2 years, and then calculate spreads for each country with respect to Germany, as
sit = ln(1+f
8
i;2;t)  ln(1+f 8GE;2;t), where sit is the forward rate spread for country i in month
t, and f 8i;2;t and f
8
GE;2;t are respectively the 8-year forward rates in 2 years for country i and
Germany (in Hardouvelis et al. (2006) spreads are calculated as f 8i;2;t f 8GE;2;t; we do not nd
any di¤erence in the results using either approach). As in Hardouvelis et al. (2006), we use
the spread between the German forward rate and the ECU forward rate as a measure of the
German spread. Moreover, we adjust for market conventions on national swap markets. In
all countries in the sample coupons are paid annually, except for Ireland and the UK, where
they are paid semiannually. We annualize interest rates in both countries. We additionally
convert swap yields to 360 days in Belgium, Ireland, and the UK, where the convention is
365 day-years. Swap data is from Datastream.
B Appendix: Exchange Rate Exposure Calculation
We characterize rms by their responses to exchange rate movements. To that end, we
calculate exchange rate betas for the rms in our sample. In this section we describe the
procedure.
A commonly used method of calculating a rms exposure to currency risk is to estimate
the following regression:
Rijt = i +$iR
j
mt + 
x
iR
j
xt ++uijt, (3)
where Rij is the stock return of rm i in country j, Rjmis the monthly return on the domestic
market portfolio in country j, Rjx is the monthly change in the exchange rate in country j,
and the xi s are then measures of currency exposure. Such an approach is used by Jorion
(1990), Bodnar and Gentry (1993), and Amihud (1994). Jorion (1991) uses a version of
this twofactor model, in which the return of the market portfolio is the rst factor and the
component of innovations in the exchange rate that is orthogonal to the market return is
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the second factor. However the procedure a¤ects only the estimates of the market beta, not
the exchange rate exposures. Therefore, we follow the simple method of Jorion (1990). We
estimate the model in (3) using monthly data from January 1992 through December 1994.34
We purposely choose an estimation period that is before our sample period, in order to avoid
potential endogeneity problems.
We calculate exchange rate betas (ERBs) with respect to the euro. Although the euro
existed only after January 1, 1999, Datastream computes a synthetic euro rate based on
the weights each currency has in the real euro. The exchange rates are expressed as units
of domestic currency per euro. Because some rms lack stock return data before 1995, the
ERB sample is smaller than our original sample
[Insert Table B.1]
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C Appendix: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition (item # refers to Worldscope eld)
Tobins Q [Market value of common equity (item 08001) + Total assets (item 02999)
Book value of common equity (item 03501)] / Total assets (item 02999)
Global industry-adjusted
Tobins Q
Tobins Q minus the median two-digit SIC code industry Tobins Q. The
median Q is calculated using all rms from all the countries with available
data on Q in Worldscope (irrespective of whether the countries and rms
are included in the regression sample).
Sales Net sales (item 01001) expressed in thousands of euro (using a synthetic
euro exchange rate prior to January 1, 1999).
EBITDA/assets Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (item 18198) / Total assets
(item 02999)
NPPE/assets Net property, plant, and equipment (item 02501) /assets (item 02999)
Leverage Total debtt 1 (item 03255) / Total assetst 1 (item 02999)
CAPEX /assets Capital Expenditures (item 04601) / Total Assets (item 02999)
R&D Expenses /assets R&D Expenses (item 01201) / Total Assets (item 02999)
GDP growth Annual real growth rate in GDP
GDP/capita Real GDP per capita, expressed in euros.
Relative change in
domestic/USD exchange
rate
[Domestic currency/USD exchange ratet - domestic currency/USD ex-
change ratet 1] / domestic currency/USD exchange ratet 1. Source:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Short-term interest rate 6-month treasury bill yield. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Term spread Di¤erence in yields between 10- year government bond and 6-month trea-
sury bill. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Government budget
decit
Domestic government budget decit as a fraction of GDP. Source: Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit
Government debt/GDP Total domestic government debt / GDP. Source: Economist Intelligence
Unit
Ination rate The ination rate as measured by the annual change in CPI. Source: Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit
Long-term interest rate 10-year government bond yield. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
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1. Throughout this paper, when we refer to the EMU countries, we mean the countries that
have entered phase III of the EMU, i.e. adopted the euro as their currency. So, for example,
Sweden, which has entered phases I and II of the EMU, but has not adopted the euro as its
currency, is not classied as an EMU country.
2. See The Wall Street Journal, "Italys Leader Stands Accused Of Euro-Heresy," 16 Jan-
uary 2002.
3. Greece adopted the euro as its currency in January 1, 20001, two years after the other
countries. Greece is excluded from the analysis, because it is di¢ cult to determine the correct
event year - speculations about Greece joining the EMU started already in January 1999.
4. ERM stands for Exchange Rate Mechanism, the previous currency arrangement in Eu-
rope. The participating countries pegged their currencies to ECU (European Currency Unit),
the precursor of the euro.
5. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) nd that among the Fortune 500 non-nancial com-
panies, 52:1 percent use currency derivatives. Allayannis and Weston (2001) analyze 720
large non-nancial rms in the US in the period 1990-1995 and report that only 37 percent
hedge their currency exposure. Among the rms in their sample with foreign sales, the
proportion of hedgers increases to 60 percent.
6. De Santis, Gerard, and Hillion (2003) argue that eliminating intra-European currency
risks may have only had a small economic impact for European corporations. Bartram and
Karolyi (2006) show that due to the introduction of the euro, the market risk has been
signicantly reduced implying that currency risks have been a major non-diversiable risk
in Europe.
7. For home equity bias, see French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994),
and Tesar and Werner (1995). Lewis (1999) provides an extensive recent survey of the
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literature. For partial segmentation models, where local risks are priced, see Errunza and
Losq (1985) and Eun and Janakiramanan (1986). Rouwenhorst (1999) nds that during
the 1990s, country factors were more important than industry factors in determining stock
returns in Europe. In contrast, Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos, and Priestley (2006) nd that
European equity markets became more integrated towards the end of the 1990s.
8. Already in January 1999, speculations started that Greece would adopt the euro. For
example, the Financial Times wrote on January 21, 1999, that "Rising condence in Greeces
chances of becoming the 12th member of the euro club drove prices on the Athens stock
exchange to record levels this month." In robustness tests, we conrm this by nding a
signicant run-up in the values of Greek rms in 1999. Moreover, when performing an
analysis of interest swap spreads similar to the one below for Greece, we nd that swap
spreads in Greece are not statistically di¤erent from the average weak-EMU country in
January 1999. However, Greeces application to join the EMU was o¢ cially accepted on
June 19, 2000. Thus determining the correct event year for Greece is di¢ cult. The e¤ect
of the inclusion of Greece in the sample depends greatly on which time period we choose as
the date of introduction of the euro in that country.
9. Denmark has maintained a very tight peg rst with the German mark and from January
1999 with the euro (e1 = DKr 7; 460:38 2:25%). The reason we classify Denmark as a
non-euro country despite the tight link with the krone and euro, is that a unilateral peg
does not provide the same kind of commitment mechanism to a monetary policy that a
currency union would provide (see Alesina and Barro, 2002, for further discussion). Our
results, however, are robust to including Denmark as a euro country (results available from
the authors upon request).
10. Imposing a survivorship bias throughout the whole period would bias our results towards
nding a positive euro valuation e¤ect.
11. German mark was the anchor currency of the European exchange rate mechamism
(ERM).
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12. In the autumn of 1992, a wave of speculative attacks hit the European exchange rate
mechanism (ERM) and its periphery. Before the end of the year, ve countries (Finland,
Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the UK) had oated their currencies and as a result their curren-
cies experienced large devaluations. Three countries (Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) where
forced to devalue their currencies in 1992-93 while maintaining a membership in ERM. The
devaluation for Ireland was smaller than for the other weak-euro countries and an argument
could be made that Ireland should be classied as a strong-euro country. In unreported
regression we show that our results remain qualitatively same even if we changed Irelands
classication.
13. Belgium and Luxembourg were in a currency union since 1992.
14. France and Belgium faced several speculative attacks during 1992-93, but these countries
managed to maintain their "franc fort" policy without a devaluation.
15. This is precisely the reason why we do not classify Denmark as an EMU-country, even
though Denmark has maintained a close peg with respect to the euro. However, we have
run our main regressions with Denmark classied as a euro-country. The results remain
qualitatively the same (results are not reported).
16. Eriksson and Whited (2000) have shown that the typical proxies for Tobins Q do not
work well as an explanatory variable in investment regressions. The reason is that marginal
Q is substituted for average Q in empirical tests. However, Tobins Q is a reasonable proxy
for rm value, and it has been extensively used in the literature (Hermalin and Weisbach,
1981; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Yermack, 1996; La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Daines, 2001).
17. Many rms in our sample have dual-class shares. For those, Worldscope reports the
market capitalization of each share class, and the market capitalization of the entire company,
which is computed as the total number of shares outstanding, other than preferred, times
the stock price of the most widely-held class. La Porta et al. (2002) argue that as the most
widely-held class usually does not carry voting rights, this computation removes any voting
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premium from the market value of the equity. In our case, as in theirs, this is an advantage
more than a problem because we are interested in the pure valuation e¤ect of the euro.
18. For more than two-thirds (24,442) of our rm-year observations the scal year end is in
December. Our results are robust to excluding rms for which the date of the scal year end
is outside December or is not reported in Worldscope.
19. As a robustness check, we have estimated our main regressions with individual-year
e¤ects. The results (unreported) show an anticipation e¤ect in 1997 in weak-euro countries,
but also that the e¤ect of the euro for strong-euro countries is concentrated in 1998.
20. Some countries, like Switzerland and the Netherlands, consistently display negative
spreads.
21. We obtain the average spread by adding the intercept in the regression to the coe¢ cients
for the years 1996, 1997, and 1998.
22. We have checked that our results are robust to excluding technology companies from
the sample (unreported), that may distort the results in the post-euro period because of the
technology bubble. The e¤ects of the euro in weak-euro countries remain unchanged, while
the e¤ect of the euro on Tobins Q in strong-euro countries is larger.
23. It could be argued that after the introduction of the euro the country-specic short-
term treasury rate is not risk-free for the countries with high debt/GDP-ratios (for example
Belgium and Italy). However, the markets do not charge the high debt/GDP-countries higher
rates.
24. Since the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted Q, we cannot take logarithms.
Hence the euro-dummy coe¢ cients cannot be interpreted as percentages.
25. Both ndings are statistically signicant at the 5 percent level.
26. The text of the Treaty is available at http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html
27. Data on corporate tax rates in Europe are from KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Survey,
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19952001.
28. It should be noted that the resulting within-country change in tax rates does not take
into account potential concurrent changes in tax deferrals and tax credits. Thus, our measure
does not necessarily capture changes in the e¤ective corporate tax rates. Furthermore, some
countries like Germany, have a split-rate system that taxes di¤erently earnings that are
retained and earnings that are paid out. In such cases we use the highest tax-rate.
29. Our denition of "small" is of course relative to the median rm covered by Worldscope.
Worldscope covers mostly the largest rms in a country.
30. Our overall ndings do not change if we re-classify these three countries. In unreported
regressions, we nd that the increase in Tobins Q is 5:3 percent for strong-euro countries
and 10:1 percent for weak-euro countries, when we reclassify France and Belgium as weak
countries and Ireland as a strong country.
31. As a robustness check, we have estimated the cost of equity capital using dividend yield
forecasts, and our results are qualitatively similar. We have also attempted to collect data
on expected growth rates to compute estimates of the cost of capital using the methodology
in Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Because expected growth rates are often negative,
we obtain negative estimates of the cost of equity for a large fraction of our sample rms.
32. Denmark also held a referendum on September 28, 2000. However, because the Danish
krone has been pegged to the euro since January 1998, and Danish authorities conrmed
that the peg would continue if the euro was rejected, the impact of the referendum on a
rms returns is more di¢ cult to assess.
33. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the analysis in this section.
34. If there are fewer than 18 observations available per rm, we exclude it from the esti-
mation.
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Table 1. Firm characteristics 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 4,242 firms (36,246 firm-years) from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with data available in Worldscope over the time period 1994-2004. See the Appendix for variable definitions. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile value of the total sample to reduce the influence of outliers. 
 
 
  
# firm-year 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Sales 
(million euros) 
  
EBITDA/TA 
  
NPPE/TA 
 
Leverage 
 
CAPEX/TA 
 
R&D/TA 
Country # firms  observations Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.  Mean Std. dev.  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Austria 79  671 1.205 0.602 549.4 1,037.1  0.108 0.076  0.369 0.217 0.249 0.168 0.062 0.054 0.006 0.014 
Belgium 101  909 1.375 0.781 949.8 2,438.7  0.117 0.092  0.232 0.211 0.225 0.170 0.055 0.068 0.002 0.010 
Finland 100  915 1.357 0.732 971.4 2,586.6  0.141 0.087  0.368 0.232 0.266 0.181 0.072 0.066 0.013 0.027 
France 598  4,936 1.371 0.782 1,548.9 4,419.2  0.111 0.089  0.230 0.213 0.242 0.181 0.050 0.057 0.006 0.021 
Germany 535  4,741 1.643 1.077 1,530.1 4,413.4  0.119 0.104  0.321 0.218 0.211 0.196 0.064 0.065 0.009 0.025 
Ireland 41  380 1.396 0.716 935.6 1,603.8  0.102 0.096  0.416 0.265 0.268 0.142 0.063 0.063 0.004 0.013 
Italy 175  1,589 1.261 0.682 2,115.6 4,829.5  0.089 0.081  0.245 0.213 0.283 0.174 0.042 0.053 0.004 0.013 
Luxemburg 11  85 1.447 1.039 1,499.4 2,848.7  0.143 0.121  0.252 0.258 0.145 0.143 0.035 0.052 0.000 0.001 
Netherlands 166  1,440 1.573 1.063 2,046.0 4,927.7  0.140 0.095  0.328 0.234 0.237 0.172 0.065 0.055 0.006 0.020 
Portugal 73  578 1.127 0.572 567.3 1,143.3  0.107 0.075  0.383 0.223 0.288 0.180 0.047 0.058 0.000 0.000 
Spain 138  1,256 1.328 0.690 1,528.1 3,870.7  0.108 0.074  0.380 0.248 0.224 0.165 0.047 0.054 0.001 0.009 
All euro countries  2,017  17,500 1.434 0.883 1,489.0 4119.3  0.115 0.093  0.297 0.229 0.238 0.182 0.061 0.061 0.006 0.020 
                    
Denmark 183  1,630 1.299 0.831 396.1 9,41.6  0.098 0.093  0.289 0.228 0.256 0.173 0.052 0.057 0.007 0.024 
Norway 159  1,234 1.531 1.090 480.7 1,599.7  0.098 0.116  0.344 0.290 0.306 0.210 0.079 0.084 0.009 0.031 
Sweden 201  1,659 1.631 1.057 1,107 2,761.5  0.112 0.111  0.320 0.267 0.253 0.203 0.060 0.061 0.012 0.032 
Switzerland 169  1,551 1.451 0.930 1,234 3,308.6  0.114 0.083  0.367 0.240 0.260 0.162 0.047 0.043 0.016 0.031 
United Kingdom 1,513  12,672 1.549 1.108 786.6 2,723.8  0.094 0.121  0.325 0.282 0.179 0.155 0.054 0.060 0.010 0.030 
All non-euro countries 2,225  18,746 1.526 1.070 798.0 2623.9  0.098 0.115  0.327 0.274 0.207 0.171 0.058 0.061 0.013 0.030 
                    
All countries 4,242  36,246 1.481 0.985 1,131.6 3445.7  0.106 0.105  0.312 0.254 0.222 0.177 0.060 0.061 0.009 0.026 
 
Table 2: Convergence of Forward Rates 
We calculate monthly forward rate differentials from swap rates between fixed and floating government bonds. We 
calculate 8-year forward rates in 2 years, and then calculate spreads for each country with respect to Germany, as 
sit=ln(1+f
8
i,2,t)- ln(1+f
8
GE,2,t), where sit is the forward rate spread for country i in month t, and f
8
i,2,t and f
8
GE,2,t are 
respectively the 8-year forward rates in 2 years for country i and Germany. We use the spread between the German 
forward rate and the ECU forward rate as a measure of the German spread. Swap data is from Datastream. As in 
Hardouvelis (2001), we adjust for market conventions on national swap markets. In all countries in the sample 
coupons are paid annually, except for Ireland and the UK, where they are paid semiannually. We annualize interest 
rates in both countries. We additionally convert swap yields to a 360 days in Belgium, Ireland, and the UK, where 
the convention is 365 day-years. We then regress the resulting forward rate differentials on time dummies. We 
construct time dummies as follows, for each year T, T=1996,...2000, the variable IT=1 for t≥T, where t is the date--
month and year--of the corresponding observation, zero otherwise.  
 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.0101 *** 13.86 0.0913 *** 22.21 0.1459 *** 28.91 0.0160 *** 13.48
1996 and After -0.0052 *** -6.73 -0.0187 *** -3.81 -0.0652 *** -9.53 -0.0084 *** -6.15
1997 and After -0.0026 *** -7.06 -0.0133 *** -3.11 -0.0549 *** -10.82 -0.0031 *** -3.51
1998 and After -0.0008 ** -2.38 -0.0056  -1.27 -0.0231 *** -9.58 -0.0044 *** -5.29
1999 and After -0.0002  -0.64 0.0048  1.20 -0.0018  -1.00 0.0013 ** 2.02
2000 -0.0003  -1.08 -0.0148 *** -4.41 -0.0004  -0.22 0.0001  0.26
Country - Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.559 0.704 0.871 0.633
Number of Observations 1,016 343 336 337
Total Sample No EMU countries Weak EMU countries
Strong EMU 
countries
Table 3. Average Tobin’s Q ratios before and after the introduction of the euro: Euro countries vs. non-euro countries  
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 4,242 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and UK) with available data in Worldscope over the time period 1994-2004. The table displays the average Tobin’s Q for the pre-euro time period 
(1994-1997) and the post-euro time-period (1998-2004), respectively. Tobin’s Q is calculated annually for each firm as the sum of the market value of equity and 
book value of total liabilities divided by the book value. Alternatively, in Panel B, we also adjust this Q measure for each firm by deducting the annual median Q 
for all firms in the Worldscope universe within the same two-digit SIC code industry. The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency 
crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The annual Tobin’s Q ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile value of the total sample to reduce 
the influence of outliers. For the reported t-tests, *, **, and ***, indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Unadjusted Tobin’s Q 
   Average Tobin’s Q   
 
 
 
Number of firms 
  
Pre-euro time period   
  
Post-euro time period  
 Difference  
(Post-euro –Pre-euro) 
 
T-test of difference 
Euro countries  2,017  1.51  1.44  -0.07 5.40*** 
Strong euro countries 1,490  1.59  1.48  -0.11 6.44*** 
Weak euro countries 527  1.29  1.31  0.02 0.90 
Non-euro countries 2,225  1.74  1.47  -0.28 16.73*** 
T-test of difference:                        
Euro vs. non-euro countries                     7.06***  1.01  9.30*** 
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries   4.13***  0.62  8.32*** 
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries    8.52***  3.69***  6.91*** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries    6.48***  4.31***  4.11** 
 
Panel B:  Global industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 
   Average global industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q   
 
 
 
Number of firms 
  
Pre-euro time period   
  
Post-euro time period  
 Difference  
(Post-euro –Pre-euro) 
 
T-test of difference 
Euro countries  2,017  0.22  0.29  0.07 6.74*** 
Strong euro countries 1,490  0.29  0.35  0.06 3.77*** 
Weak euro countries 527  0.02  0.20  0.18 7.79*** 
Non-euro countries  2,225  0.41  0.29  -0.12 7.05*** 
T-test of difference:                        
Euro vs. non-euro countries                                     6.29***  0.80  9.62*** 
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries   3.56***  2.17**  7.36*** 
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries    7.96***  2.48***  8.20*** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries    5.94***  4.02***  3.65*** 
 
 
Table 4. The introduction of the euro and corporate valuations: Main regression results 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 4,242 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1994-2004. The dependent variable is the log of Tobin’s Q in columns (1) - (4), 
and is the global industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in columns (5) - (8). Estimation by OLS with fixed firm and year effects. All firm-level variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile value of the total sample to reduce the influence of outliers. The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1998-2004. The euro-
countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. See the Appendix for other variable 
definitions. Panel A reports the regression estimates using all individual years in the panel. Panel B reports the estimation results from a regression model where 
the panel is reduced to two-periods by averaging the data before and after the introduction of the euro. Standard errors robust to clustering on country level are 
reported within brackets.  *, **, and ***, indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full panel regressions 
 
Dependent variable: 
Log(Tobin’s Q) 
Dependent variable:  
Global industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent variable: 
Log(Tobin’s Q) 
Dependent variable: 
Global industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.090**  0.137**  0.078**  0.121**  
 [0.031]  [0.050]  [0.030]  [0.053]  
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy  0.057**  0.091*  0.061*  0.097 
  [0.027]  [0.046]  [0.033]  [0.058] 
Weak euro country  x post-euro dummy  0.171***  0.251***  0.128***  0.191*** 
  [0.025]  [0.043]  [0.031]  [0.063] 
Log (Sales) -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.140*** -0.141*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.141*** -0.142*** 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.028] [0.028] [0.010] [0.010] [0.028] [0.028] 
EBITDA/TA 0.803*** 0.801*** 1.515*** 1.512*** 0.803*** 0.802*** 1.515*** 1.513*** 
 [0.054] [0.054] [0.124] [0.123] [0.054] [0.054] [0.123] [0.123] 
Leverage -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.284*** -0.285*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.288*** -0.288*** 
 [0.026] [0.024] [0.057] [0.054] [0.025] [0.024] [0.054] [0.054] 
NPPE/TA -0.119*** -0.112*** -0.115** -0.105* -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.104* -0.101* 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.052] [0.050] [0.026] [0.025] [0.051] [0.050] 
CAPEX/TA 0.490*** 0.479** 0.847** 0.832** 0.479** 0.476** 0.832** 0.828** 
 [0.164] [0.166] [0.349] [0.351] [0.168] [0.168] [0.355] [0.354] 
R&D/TA  0.350 0.354 0.995 1.001 0.348 0.350 0.992 0.996 
 [0.352] [0.352] [0.768] [0.767] [0.349] [0.350] [0.766] [0.766] 
GDP growth 0.012 0.015** 0.019 0.024* 0.010 0.012* 0.017 0.020 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.014] [0.013] [0.006] [0.006] [0.012] [0.013] 
Log(GDP/capita) 0.013 -0.273 0.110 -0.293 -0.046 -0.184 0.021 -0.173 
 [0.253] [0.206] [0.401] [0.354] [0.157] [0.200] [0.279] [0.354] 
Relative change in domestic/USD- -0.016 -0.027 -0.097 -0.111 -0.129* -0.097 -0.256** -0.211* 
exchange rate [0.077] [0.076] [0.118] [0.116] [0.073] [0.077] [0.103] [0.113] 
Short-term interest rate     -0.026** -0.016 -0.037** -0.023 
     [0.009] [0.014] [0.015] [0.025] 
Term-spread     -0.014 -0.006 -0.021 -0.010 
     [0.016] [0.018] [0.028] [0.033] 
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.175 0.179 0.091 0.093 0.179 0.180 0.093 0.093 
Number of firm-year observations 36,246 36,246 36,246 36,246 36,246 36,246 36,246 36,246 
P-value from F-test:  
Strong euro vs. weak euro firms 
  
<0.000 
  
0.000 
  
0.114 
  
0.229 
 
Panel B: Two-period (pre- and post euro) panel regressions  
 
Dependent variable: 
Log(Tobin’s Q) 
Dependent variable:  
Global industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent variable: 
Log(Tobin’s Q) 
Dependent variable: 
Global industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.110**  0.174**  0.095*  0.153*  
 [0.038]  [0.068]  [0.045]  [0.087]  
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy  0.081**  0.140**  0.084  0.154 
  [0.031]  [0.063]  [0.050]  [0.102] 
Weak euro country  x post-euro dummy  0.184***  0.260***  0.127***  0.150 
  [0.036]  [0.078]  [0.034]  [0.103] 
Log (Sales) -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.147** -0.149*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.149** -0.149** 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.051] [0.050] [0.011] [0.011] [0.051] [0.052] 
EBITDA/TA 0.895*** 0.890*** 1.730*** 1.723*** 0.886*** 0.887*** 1.717*** 1.717*** 
 [0.125] [0.121] [0.544] [0.538] [0.120] [0.119] [0.535] [0.536] 
Leverage -0.072** -0.073** -0.162** -0.163** -0.080** -0.078** -0.174** -0.174** 
 [0.031] [0.028] [0.074] [0.071] [0.028] [0.027] [0.071] [0.071] 
NPPE/TA -0.225*** -0.218*** -0.446*** -0.438*** -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.417*** -0.417*** 
 [0.029] [0.026] [0.058] [0.058] [0.024] [0.025] [0.055] [0.057] 
CAPEX/TA 0.083 0.081 0.155 0.152 0.078 0.078 0.148 0.148 
 [0.055] [0.053] [0.108] [0.106] [0.056] [0.055] [0.109] [0.109] 
R&D/TA  0.468*** 0.469*** 1.431*** 1.433*** 0.456*** 0.455*** 1.416*** 1.416*** 
 [0.116] [0.111] [0.310] [0.305] [0.122] [0.121] [0.331] [0.332] 
GDP growth 0.182* 0.127 0.655*** 0.591*** 0.016 0.031 0.417*** 0.416*** 
 [0.089] [0.091] [0.166] [0.169] [0.063] [0.075] [0.108] [0.131] 
Log(GDP/capita) 0.031** 0.038*** 0.058** 0.066*** 0.024** 0.028** 0.048** 0.048** 
 [0.013] [0.011] [0.024] [0.022] [0.009] [0.011] [0.017] [0.022] 
Relative change in domestic/USD- 0.447** 0.453** 0.479 0.485 0.437*** 0.477*** 0.449 0.445 
exchange rate [0.206] [0.184] [0.363] [0.335] [0.142] [0.159] [0.295] [0.322] 
Short-term interest rate     -0.031* -0.020 -0.046 -0.047 
     [0.016] [0.025] [0.031] [0.055] 
Term-spread     -0.005 0.003 -0.011 -0.012 
     [0.040] [0.045] [0.075] [0.092] 
Post-euro time period dummy -0.156*** -0.138*** -0.170*** -0.148** -0.141 -0.121 -0.155 -0.157 
 [0.032] [0.040] [0.050] [0.057] [0.101] [0.113] [0.177] [0.213] 
Fixed firm-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.285 0.292 0.144 0.146 0.295 0.295 0.148 0.148 
Number of firm-year observations 8,484 8,484 8,484 8,484 8,484 8,484 8,484 8,484 
P-value from F-test:  
Strong euro vs. weak euro firms 
  
0.001 
  
0.049 
  
0.371 
  
0.944 
 
Table 5. The introduction of the euro and corporate valuations: Robustness to Maastricht 
convergence criteria variables and changes in corporate taxation 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 4,242 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time 
period 1994-2004. The dependent variable is the log of Tobin’s Q. Estimation by OLS with fixed firm and year 
effects.  All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile value of the total sample. The post-euro 
time period is defined as the years 1998-2004. The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent 
currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The four variables included to control for the formal 
convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty are: government budget deficit, government debt/GDP, the annual 
inflation rate, and the nominal long-term (10 year) interest rate. In column (1), the convergence variables are 
calculated as the deviations from the Maastricht criteria for each criterion that is not fulfilled, and are set to zero 
otherwise. In column (2) the convergence variables are included without any adjustments. The corporate tax-rate is 
the domestic corporate tax-rate faced by public firms as reported by KPMG. The same set of firm and country 
control variables as in Table 4 (expect short-term interest rate and the term spread) are included but not reported.  
Standard errors robust to clustering on country level are reported within brackets. *, **, and ***, indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Log(Tobin’s Q) 
 
Adjusted convergence 
variables  
Unadjusted convergence 
variables 
Explanatory variable: (1)  (2) 
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.061**  0.075* 
 [0.027]  [0.037] 
Weak euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.152***  0.150*** 
 [0.026]  [0.029] 
Convergence criteria variables:    
Government deficit -0.419  0.329 
 [0.972]  [0.381] 
Government debt/GDP -0.053  0.088 
 [0.126]  [0.078] 
Inflation rate -0.249  0.087 
 [1.374]  [0.596] 
Long-term nominal interest rate  -0.041**  -0.017 
 [0.017]  [0.010] 
Corporate tax rate 0.204*  0.124 
 [0.114]  [0.115] 
Firm and country controls YES  YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES  YES 
R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.180  0.180 
Number of observations 36,246  36,246 
P-value from F-test:     
Strong euro country vs. weak euro country  0.010  0.117 
 
 Table 6. The introduction of the euro and corporate valuations: The impact of euro 
exchange rate exposure  
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 3,017 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with available data in Worldscope over the time 
period 1994-2004. The dependent variable is the log of Tobin’s Q. Estimation by OLS with fixed firm and year 
effects. All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile value of the total sample. The post-euro 
time period is defined as the years 1998-2004. The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent 
currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The euro exchange rate exposure is measured as the 
exchange rate beta from a two-factor model of stock returns in which changes in the (synthetic) euro exchange rate 
and the domestic stock market return are the two factors. The estimations of exchange rate betas (ERBs) are 
performed using monthly data over the time period January 1992 to December 1994. A significant positive 
(negative) ERB implies that the firm benefits (is hurt) when the firm’s domestic currency depreciates relative to the 
synthetic euro. A firm is classified as having a significant (positive or negative) ERB if it is significant at the 5%-
level according to a one-sided t-test. The same set of firm and country control variables as in Table 4 are included 
but not reported.  Standard errors robust to clustering on country level are reported within brackets.  *, **, and ***, 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Log(Tobin’s Q) 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) 
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.064* 0.065* 
 [0.032] [0.037] 
Strong euro country x sign. positive ERB x post-euro dummy -0.015 -0.014 
 [0.014] [0.014] 
Strong euro country x sign. negative ERB x post-euro dummy -0.023 -0.023 
 [0.027] [0.027] 
Weak euro country x post-euro dummy  0.156*** 0.108*** 
 [0.025] [0.031] 
Weak euro country x sign. positive ERB x post-euro dummy 0.036 0.036 
 [0.056] [0.055] 
Weak euro country x sign. negative ERB x post-euro dummy 0.068*** 0.064*** 
 [0.018] [0.018] 
Firm and country controls YES YES 
Short-term interest rate and term spread NO YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES 
R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.147 0.149 
Number of firm-year observations 27,349 27,349 
P-value from F-test:    
Strong euro x sign. positive ERB vs. strong euro x sign. negative ERB 0.820 0.807 
Weak euro x sign. positive ERB vs. weak euro x sign. negative ERB 0.603 0.629 
Strong euro x sign. positive ERB vs. weak euro x sign. positive ERB 0.400 0.399 
Strong euro x sign. negative ERB vs. weak euro x sign. negative ERB 0.010 0.013 
 
 Table 7. The introduction of the euro and corporate valuations: Large vs. small firms  
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 4,242 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time 
period 1994-2004. The dependent variable is the log of Tobin’s Q. Estimation by OLS with fixed firm and year 
effects. All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile value of the total sample. The post-euro 
time period is defined as the years 1998-2004. The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent 
currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. A firm is classified as large if its sales are above the 
median sales of the sample in 1997; otherwise it is classified as small. The same set of firm and country control 
variables as in Table 4 are included but not reported. Standard errors robust to clustering on country level are 
reported within brackets.  *, **, and ***, indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Log(Tobin’s Q) 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) 
Strong euro country  x large firm x post-euro dummy 0.057 0.061 
 [0.039] [0.044] 
Strong euro country  x small firm x post-euro dummy 0.055*** 0.059** 
 [0.017] [0.023] 
Weak euro country  x large firm x post-euro dummy 0.155*** 0.111** 
 [0.033] [0.038] 
Weak euro country  x small firm x post-euro dummy 0.194*** 0.153*** 
 [0.036] [0.039] 
Large firm x post-euro dummy  0.012 0.012 
 [0.024] [0.023] 
Firm and country controls YES YES 
Short-term interest rate and term spread NO YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES 
R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.179 0.180 
Number of observations 36,246 36,246 
P-value from F-test:    
Strong euro x large firm vs. strong euro x small firm 0.967 0.944 
Weak euro x large firm vs. weak euro x small firm 0.381 0.312 
Strong euro x large firm vs. weak euro x large firm 0.001 0.235 
Strong euro x small firm vs. weak euro x small firm 0.002 0.077 
 
Table 8. The introduction of the euro and corporate valuations: Effects by individual euro 
countries 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 4,242 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time 
period 1994-2004. The dependent variable is the log of Tobin’s Q. Estimation by OLS with fixed firm and year 
effects. All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile value of the total sample. The post-euro 
time period is defined as the years 1998-2004. The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent 
currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  The same set of firm and country control variables 
as in Table 4 are included but not reported. Standard errors robust to clustering on country level are reported within 
brackets.  *, **, and ***, indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Log(Tobin’s Q) 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) 
Strong euro countries   
Austria  x post-euro dummy 0.017 0.021 
 [0.025] [0.032] 
Belgium  x post-euro dummy 0.064*** 0.064** 
 [0.019] [0.024] 
France  x post-euro dummy 0.088*** 0.086** 
 [0.028] [0.037] 
Germany  x post-euro dummy 0.046 0.052 
 [0.030] [0.035] 
Luxemburg  x post-euro dummy -0.083* -0.091 
 [0.043] [0.052] 
Netherlands  x post-euro dummy 0.047** 0.050* 
 [0.021] [0.027] 
Weak euro countries   
Finland x post-euro dummy 0.132*** 0.119*** 
 [0.039] [0.036] 
Ireland  x post-euro dummy 0.112 0.082 
 [0.110] [0.095] 
Italy  x post-euro dummy 0.195*** 0.146*** 
 [0.026] [0.029] 
Portugal post-euro dummy 0.170*** 0.124*** 
 [0.022] [0.033] 
Spain  x post-euro dummy 0.170*** 0.132*** 
 [0.029] [0.035] 
Short-term interest rate and term spread NO YES 
Firm and country controls YES YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES 
R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.180 0.181 
Number of firm-year observations 36,246 36,246 
 
  
  
Table 9. The introduction of the euro and corporate valuations: Change in cost of equity? 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 3,756 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with data in Worldscope over the time period 1994-
2004. The dependent variable is the cost of equity in columns (1) and (2), and is the log of Tobin’s Q in columns (3) 
and (4). Estimation by OLS with fixed firm and year effects. Cost of equity is estimated as the consensus forecast of 
earnings per share divided by the stock price. The forecast data is from I/B/E/S.  All firm-level variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile value of the total sample. The post-euro time period is defined as the years 
1998-2004. The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The same set of firm and country control variables as in Table 4 are included but not 
reported.  Standard errors robust to clustering on country level are reported within brackets.  *, **, and ***, 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Cost of equity  
Dependent variable: 
 Log(Tobin’s Q) 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.003 0.006  0.058** 0.057* 
 [0.006] [0.005]  [0.026] [0.032] 
Weak euro country  x post-euro dummy -0.025*** -0.009  0.145*** 0.115*** 
 [0.005] [0.009]  [0.020] [0.031] 
Cost of equity    -0.932*** -0.921*** 
    [0.139] [0.140] 
Firm and country controls YES YES  YES YES 
Short-term interest rate and term spread NO YES  NO YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES  YES YES 
R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.048 0.055  0.245 0.247 
Number of observations 27,691 27,691  27,691 27,691 
P-value from F-test:  
Strong euro vs. weak euro firms 
 
0.003 
 
0.006 
  
0.058 
 
0.057 
 
Table 10. The introduction of the euro and stock returns 
We construct within-country portfolios of monthly stock returns, classified by the ERB of the firms in the country. 
Within each country, we construct three value-weighted portfolios: one portfolio contains all firms whose ERB is 
positive and significant. A second portfolio contains all firms whose ERB is negative and significant. The third 
portfolio contains all other firms, for which the currency exposure is not significant. Stock returns and market 
capitalization is from Datastream. We therefore have 132 monthly observations on 16×3 portfolios (a total of 6,336 
observations). The event window is from November 1997 through May 1998. We then regress monthly returns on 
the MSCI World Index, the MSCI Europe index, and event dummies, interacted with portfolio characteristics 
(ERBs) and country characteristics (euro membership and strong/weak classification). The euro-countries classified 
as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity are reported within brackets.  *, **, and ***, indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Monthly Returns on Value-
Weighted, Within Country Portfolios 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
MSCI World 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.543*** 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] 
MSCI Europe 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
EMU Country x Intro Euro 0.034*** 0.004 0.020* 0.047*** 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.000] [0.011] 
Weak EMU Country x Intro Euro  0.053*** 0.056***  
  [0.015] [0.014]  
ERB Positive and Significant   -0.002 0 
   [0.002] [0.003] 
ERB Positive and Significant x Intro Euro   -0.031 -0.053*** 
   [0.020] [0.014] 
ERB Negative and Significant   -0.002 0.001 
   [0.002] [0.002] 
ERB Negative and Significant x Intro Euro   -0.021 -0.060*** 
   [0.015] [0.012] 
ERB Negative and Significant x Weak EMU    -0.008* 
    [0.004] 
ERB Negative and Significant x Intro Euro x Weak EMU    0.078*** 
    [0.021] 
ERB Positive and Significant x Weak EMU    -0.006 
    [0.005] 
ERB Positive and Significant x Intro Euro x Weak EMU    0.046 
    [0.031] 
Year dummies and country-fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Number of firm-year observations 6,336 6,336 6,336 6,336 
P-value from F-test:      
ERB Positive vs. ERB Negative   0.8869 0.6532 
ERB Positive x Euro vs. ERB Negative x  Euro   0.4321 0.1741 
Weak EMU x ERB Positive vs. Weak EMU x ERB 
Negative 
   0.6547 
Weak EMU x ERB Positive x Euro vs. Weak EMU x 
ERB Negative x Euro 
   0.0012 
 
Table 11. Swedish EMU Referendum Poll Results and Individual Firm Stock Returns 
We regress individual firm weekly stock returns for firms in Sweden on the domestic market return, the change in 
exchange rate between the euro and the dollar, and indicators of poll results related to the Swedish referendum in 
September 14, 2003. The polls are conducted in the months prior to the referendum. We calculate two dummy 
variables: the first dummy equals one if the percent of "Yes" votes in an opinion poll increases relative to the 
previous one, zero otherwise. The second dummy variable equals one if the percent of "Yes" votes in the poll 
exceeds the percent of "No" votes in the poll. We ignore undecided voters.  The poll data for Sweden has been 
collected by Synovate Temo, and can be found in http://www.temo.se/dok/proj/EMU/EMUsamtliga.asp. Stock 
prices and exchange rates are from Datastream. . The euro exchange rate exposure is measured as the exchange rate 
beta from a two-factor model of stock returns in which changes in the (synthetic) euro exchange rate and the 
domestic stock market return are the two factors. The estimations of exchange rate betas (ERBs) are performed 
using monthly data over the time period January 1992 to December 1994. A significant positive (negative) ERB 
implies that the firm benefits (is hurt) when the firm’s domestic currency depreciates relative to the synthetic euro. A 
firm is classified as having a significant (positive or negative) ERB if it is significant at the 5%-level according to a 
one-sided t-test. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported within brackets.  *, **, and ***, indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Individual Firm Weekly 
Returns 
  (1) (2) 
Increase in "Yes" relative to previous week  0.021*  
 [0.012]  
Increase in "Yes" x ERB negative and Significant  0.034  
 [0.021]  
Increase in "Yes" x ERB positive and Significant  -0.077***  
 [0.030]  
"Yes"> "No"   -0.002 
  [0.004] 
"Yes"> "No" x ERB negative and Significant   0.008* 
  [0.005] 
"Yes"> "No"  x ERB positive and Significant   -0.017** 
  [0.007] 
Market Return 0.647*** 0.584*** 
 [0.086] [0.078] 
Change in Exchange Rate Euro / Dollar -0.183** -0.199** 
 [0.088] [0.089] 
Constant 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] 
Number of Firm - Week Observations 2,964 2,964 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 
 
 
  
Table B.1 Euro exchange rate exposure 
The euro exchange rate exposure is measured as the exchange rate beta from a two-factor model of stock returns in 
which changes in the (synthetic) euro exchange rate and the domestic stock market return are the two factors. The 
estimations of exchange rate betas are performed using monthly data over the time period January 1992 to 
December 1994. All data is from DataStream. The % Significant is based on significance at the 5%-level. 
 
Positive Exchange Rate Beta Negative Exchange Rate Beta 
Country N 
Median 
Exchange 
Rate Beta N % Significant % Firms % Significant 
Euro countries:       
Austria 56 -0.306 19 21.1 37 18.9 
Belgium 80 -0.027 36 11.1 44 13.6 
Finland 43 -0.213 15 40.0 28 32.1 
France 394 0.124 212 17.5 182 17.6 
Germany 444 0.074 238 18.9 206 13.6 
Ireland 36 -0.779 8 37.5 28 35.7 
Italy 130 -0.341 42 23.8 88 36.4 
Luxemburg 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands 133 0.764 102 29.4 31 9.7 
Portugal 59 0.425 39 28.2 20 10.0 
Spain 103 -0.244 43 32.6 60 26.7 
Total 1,534 0.021 780 21.2 754 22.0 
Non-euro countries:       
Denmark 161 -0.046 81 28.4 80 10.0 
Norway 75 0.034 31 19.4 44 25.0 
Sweden 107 -0.481 43 27.9 64 46.9 
Switzerland 120 0.068 65 16.9 55 20.0 
UK 1,076 -0.497 297 16.4 779 35.3 
Total 1,539 -0.321 517 19.5 1,022 32.8 
 
  
Figure 1. Forward Rate Differentials as measures of the Probability of Convergence to the EMU. 
The figure shows forward rate differentials with Germany, averaged across areas within Europe. We estimate market-based probabilities of adopting the euro for 
the fifteen countries in our sample from forward rates differentials. We calculate monthly forward rate differentials from swap rates between fixed and floating 
rate government bonds. We calculate 8-year forward rates in 2 years, and then calculate spreads for each country with respect to Germany, as sit=ln(1+f
8
i,2,t)- 
ln(1+f8GE,2,t), where sit is the forward rate spread for country i in month t, and f
8
i,2,t and f
8
GE,2,t are respectively the 8-year forward rates in 2 years for country i and 
Germany. We use the spread between the German forward rate and the ECU forward rate as a measure of the German spread. Swap data is from Datastream. As 
in Hardouvelis (2001), we adjust for market conventions on national swap markets. In all countries in the sample coupons are paid annually, except for Ireland 
and the UK, where they are paid semiannually. We annualize interest rates in both countries. We additionally convert swap yields to a 360 days in Belgium, 
Ireland, and the UK, where the convention is 365 day-years. 
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